Today the world is at an early stage of a global crisis, as evidenced by a sharp increase in conflicts as states vie to become centres of power. This concerns, in particular, the Ukraine conflict, the situation in the Middle East, a set of problems in relations between India and China, and the Taiwan problem.
Despite this consistent growth of contradictions, the volatility indicates that following their conclusion, a new world order will be formed. This circumstance presents the states of the Global South with the problem of determining their own identity. One of the ways to solve this problem may be to create an original epistemology, to separate from Western tradition, to describe the international reality in which we now find ourselves. This task is quite new for the Global South: over the past decades, the elites of these countries have felt themselves relatively comfortable in the international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War.
What did this world order look like? In the era of liberal globalisation, the leading role in world politics has been played by Western countries, and above all, the United States. Washington offered the countries of the Global South a convenient and stable system of “common goods”. One of its foundations was the American dollar as a global currency, which made global trade relatively cheap and seamless. Another key aspect was American military aid. Many countries, including Israel, Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia built their military capabilities using American technology, receiving billions of dollars in military aid from the United States for decades. Such support ensured stability and allowed the elites of these countries to feel quite comfortable on the world stage.
Another important element of the liberal consensus was the English language, which began to play the role of the main means of international communication – even in countries that do not maintain close relations with the United States, such as Iran or Cuba. The global information space was largely shaped by American popular culture and the global English-language media, which, among other things, became a source of images and metaphors for the Western epistemology of international relations. Western epistemology, taking root through language, education, and culture, shaped the worldview of the new elites of the Global South. Many diplomats and political leaders were trained in the West and, returning home, transmitted Western views on international relations.
However, over time, the hidden risks associated with this system of universal comfort in which Washington had invested as an instrument of influence on the elites and policies of the beneficiary countries began to emerge. In recent years, the United States began to use the “common good” of the global dollar-centric financial system as an instrument of pressure. Harsh restrictive measures against the world’s largest powers – Russia and China – made the countries of the Global South fear that the United States could use similar measures against them. This has forced individual countries to seek alternative development paths outside the liberal consensus. Among these countries, there is a growing understanding of the need to create their own rules of the game by which the new world order will function; countries have become aware of their own share of “common goods” production. These processes are accompanied by searching for their own epistemology of international relations that would reflect national interests and experience. The identity of the Global South is not monolithic and countries are at different stages of this path – they can be conditionally divided into two clusters: (1) those who prefer global (Western) epistemology to a nation-specific one and follow the proverbial leader in foreign policy; (2) those attempting to pursue autonomous strategic thinking based on an original epistemology and develop foreign policy independently.
A striking example of a country belonging to the first group is Japan, which seeks to maintain constructive relations with the United States in the context of growing tensions in the region and actively supports plans to create a “Pacific NATO” under the auspices of the United States. The countries that side with the leader do so because, although they might want to have more autonomy, they are forced to pursue the most effective ways to stay on their feet amid the “crumbling world order” and see such an opportunity in associating themselves with the “foreman”. In such countries, the issue of identity is often resolved in the simplest way – by importing ideas. The second group of countries includes, first of all, Russia, China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. These countries have moved on to developing their own approaches to the theory and practice of world politics, reflecting the peculiarities of their national identity and corresponding to their national interests. These countries are actively experimenting with new trade and financial networks, digital currencies, new negotiation formats and sometimes, testing the boundaries of the possible, acting quite opportunistically and resorting to force.
The current turning point in history is a time of opportunity. The world order is evolving towards sustainable multipolarity, and the countries of the Global South are beginning to play an active role in shaping this new world order. The effectiveness of their actions largely depends on the quality of the strategic thinking of the elites of these countries – their ability and readiness, based on their own historical experience, to recognise their national interests and construct a new non-Western-centric framework of knowledge and narratives, an epistemology of international relations.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
