On November 5, 2024, Donald Trump was chosen to become the next president of the United States. An analysis of the activities of the first Trump administration (2017-2021) and his statements during this year’s election campaign allow us to outline the possible contours and dominant features of American policy towards China over the next four years. They, it seems, will not differ substantially from what we observed during his first presidential term.
The US policy of containing China, determined by a critical mass of circumstances and factors that do not depend on the change in American administrations, will definitely continue. We should not forget that it was under Trump that the deterrence against China became an openly articulated US strategy. It was Trump who initiated the tariff and technological war with China, and launched the process of decoupling or disconnection from the Chinese economy. At the moment, the only intrigue is what form this confrontation and containment of China will take over the next four years.
The key to understanding what Trump’s China policy will be is the perspective or prism through which he evaluates the People’s Republic. Trump sees China as a country that has long been a parasite on the openness of the American economy, an economy that has become the main beneficiary of economic globalisation, which was originally designed to advance American interests. For Trump, China is, first and foremost, a threat to the development of the American economy, the prosperity of the United States, and the preservation of its economic and technological superiority. He views relations with China to a decisive extent through the prism of his trade and economic agenda, and will likely try to force Beijing to change its industrial and foreign trade policies. Trump seeks to protect US domestic industry and limit China’s technological progress. In his interactions with China, his main goal is to protect American business, in the name of whose interests Trump intends to increase pressure on China so that it changes its industrial policy and increases purchases of American goods, helping to reduce the US trade deficit. However, it is important to take into account that, unlike during Trump’s first presidency, the negotiation process on trade and economic issues will now become more tough and complicated. China has demonstrated its inability to fulfil the terms of the trade agreement concluded with Trump in January 2020. Beijing’s lack of transparency, as they say in the United States, in communicating with the world during the COVID-19 pandemic could not but cause Trump to become suspicious and mistrustful of the Chinese leadership.
In interaction with Beijing, Washington is set to rely on tough negotiations and bargaining tactics. Washington will use China’s “pain points” as a bargaining chip to compel Beijing to make concessions that interest Trump (firstly, changes in its foreign trade and industrial policies).
Negotiating leverage will be consolidated through large-scale unilateral actions and tough rhetoric. The most likely subject of bargaining may be the Taiwan issue, which is somewhat less important for the Republican administration than for the Democrats (for example, the outgoing Biden administration). Trump is likely to take a highly personal approach to his communications with China, framing his relationship with Xi as the decisive factor in the development of US-China dynamics. At the same time, one can expect a difference between Trump’s sporadic expressions of admiration and respect for Xi and Trump’s actual tough, unfriendly actions toward China.
An escalation of the tariff and technology war with China and the continuation of the decoupling process can be considered a foregone conclusion. The likelihood of new tariffs on Chinese products is high for at least two reasons. First, during the election campaign, Trump clearly stated his intention to introduce tariffs of at least 60% on imports from China (for comparison’s sake, the average US tariff rate on imports from China during Trump’s first presidency peaked at 21%). Second, the idea of introducing tariffs enjoys significant public support in the US and even the approval of Democratic legislators. More radical measures, such as the abolition of most-favoured-nation treatment for China, cannot be ruled out. There will also be a tightening of export controls, controls over the inflow of foreign investment from China to the US, and American investment in China in certain segments of the Chinese economy (primarily in the semiconductor industry and so-called emerging industries).
The decoupling process will also continue. In a September 2024 speech, Trump promised to make the United States “truly self-reliant” and that all essential materials for national security will be made in the United States. How far Trump can go in this direction remains an open question, but it is quite predictable that the decoupling of the American and Chinese economies will continue. Trends towards economic, resource, and techno-nationalism will expand in American policy.
Conceptually, Trump will build a stand-alone strategy towards China, which won’t be part of a comprehensive strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region. Guided by the “America First” philosophy and viewing allied relations as limiting freedom of manoeuvre for the United States (and allies as long-term parasites on the United States), Trump will be inclined to shift the focus of the policy of containing China from a multilateral to a unilateral format. US interest in strengthening the network of allied relations and building a bloc architecture will decrease compared to the period of Biden’s presidency. Washington will encourage its allies to bear the burden of responsibility for their security. Trilateral dialogues with Asian partners (for example, the US-South Korea-Japan and US-Japan-Philippines triangles), which have received a strong impetus for development under Biden, may fade into the background, while the Quad format, on the contrary, may remain an important platform for consolidated pressure on China. Quad was revived by Trump and, moreover, security issues have ceased to be dominant on the agenda of this association, giving way to interaction between the four countries in such areas as critical and new technologies, clean energy, etc. This quadrilateral format may prove instrumental for Trump in achieving one of his important goals – ousting China from global and regional supply chains.
Trump’s rejection of multilateralism may have twofold consequences for China. On the one hand, this could undermine Washington’s ability to compete with Beijing by weakening the network of alliances and partnerships that expand US global and regional influence. But on the other hand, given Washington’s pressure on Tokyo and Seoul to increase costs for maintaining US bases on their territory and to take greater responsibility for their security, Japan and South Korea will be forced to increase defence spending and strengthen military-political axes (such as the already developing Japan-Australia, Japan-Philippines, and South Korea-Japan axes), as well as alternative mini-multilateral structures, and play a more active role in the region.
Finally, on the Taiwan issue, which is the most complex in US-China relations and carries a huge potential for conflict, Trump will continue to support the island, but with some nuances. Trump will probably encourage Taiwan to base its independent planning, relying on its own forces, ensure the island’s defence capabilities and, accordingly, increase defence spending and imports of American weapons. An increase in US arms sales to Taiwan is quite expected, which, by the way, will be a constant irritant to Beijing.
It is worth remembering that it was under the first Trump administration that the United States approved more arms sales to Taiwan in value terms than under any previous US administration. From 2017 to 2021 alone, the total amount of contracts exceeded $18 billion.
Trump can also be
expected to put pressure on Taiwan with respect to trade and economic issues.
This is evident from Trump’s statements such as his July 2023 assertion that “Taiwan,
they took our business away. We should have stopped them. We should have taxed
them. We should have tariffed them.” In a July 2024 interview, Trump said that
Taiwan “did take about 100% of our chip business… Taiwan should pay us for
defence… You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan
doesn’t give us anything.” Trump’s focus will be on the semiconductor industry
and the transfer of Taiwanese semiconductor expertise and capacity to the
United States. Overall, the Taiwan card will be actively played by Trump in his
interactions with Beijing, which, however, will ultimately not lead to a
reduction in US support for Taiwan, but will remain simply an element of the
game.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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