It is natural for any state to prioritize those geographic regions from which the main threat to its basic interests and values originates. Russia is no exception, and for more than 500 years, the West and relations with it have occupied a central place in Russian foreign policy. Moreover, the main administrative and industrial centres of Russia are located in close proximity to Europe – the historical West, writes Timofei Bordachev for the 15th Asian Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Therefore, the biggest obstacle to looking more closely to the East, towards Asia, in our case was that this geographic region has never posed a fundamental threat. In this regard, Asia is inferior not only to the West, but also to the South in Russian geopolitics – the latter region is in any case closely connected with the internal structure of the country as a multinational and multi-confessional society. There have been no military invasions of Russia’s territory from Asia since the mid-13th century; there are no powers there for whom fighting Russia would be the main thrust of their foreign policy. There are no states in Asia that would bear deep grievances against Russia, like the countries of Europe – from Poland, which we conquered in the 18th century, to France and Germany, which we defeated in the 19th and 20th centuries. In recent times, this has been compounded by the absence of military-political alliances in Asia whose internal cohesion would be based on the task of confronting Russia or preparing for aggression against it. Such alliances do not exist there and cannot arise, due to regional geopolitics and the peculiarities of historical development.
Since Russia has never had grounds to take threats to its eastern territories seriously, their development was considered secondary, due to the interests of national security. This, we recall, is a necessary condition for attention on the part of the Russian state, whose most important task has historically been the defence of the land and the people inhabiting it. In other words, the true concentration of forces in Asia was hindered by the objective geopolitical considerations of the state, which had always been very prudent in distributing its limited resources over the colossal territory of northern Eurasia. The eastern part of Russia received the greatest theoretical attention during the late imperial period, when at the turn of the century the outstanding Russian scientist Vladimir Semenov Tian-Shansky compared our state to a thinning sword, the main part of which was located in the West, and the weak point was turned to Asia. However, at that time, the basis for concern and the argument in favour of the need to expand its presence in Asia was the growing threat emanating from the Japanese Empire, which was dynamically developing and had inflicted a humiliating defeat on Russia in the war of 1904-1905. However, by the middle of the last century, the Japanese problem had been solved: partly through the efforts of Russia (the USSR) itself, and first and foremost through the decisive actions of the United States, which still exercises control over Japanese sovereignty and will not ever allow the country to gain its own strength. Just as they do with Russia’s neighbour in the West – Germany, which shared a similar historical fate. With the disappearance of Japan’s great power status, even a hypothetical threat from the East disappeared. With it disappeared reasons for taking a serious look at Asia. China, during the revolutionary stage of its foreign policy, was perceived in Moscow as a threat. This forced Russia to take certain actions aimed at Asia. On its territory, it began strengthening the transport and logistics system linking the European and Asian parts of the state. In foreign policy, cooperation with China’s regional counterweights, primarily Vietnam, was increased, as well as a direct military presence in the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia. These measures became, until the last decade, the most large-scale manifestations of Russian attention towards Asia – which, as we have seen, has no fundamental geopolitical basis.
However, the nature of Russian policy in Asia is currently changing, as are the motives that form it. For more than 15 years, the main driving factor has been the economic growth of Asian countries and their ability to act for Russia not only as trading partners, but also as sources of necessary technologies and other resources, which are limited in Russia. Asia is gradually and increasingly being viewed as a replacement for Europe, a traditional partner in matters of modernisation and increasing competitiveness at the global level.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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