Based on these evidences and reasons, many analysts have considered Iran the main loser in the recent developments in Syria (Eliot A. Cohen, Lyuba Lulko & Dmitry Sudakov, Natasha Hall and Joost Hiltermann & Nicholas Kristof). But are these judgments correct, and has Iran lost everything in Syria?
The ultimate answer to this question is no, for several reasons.
First, the difference between official and unofficial positions. Usually, individuals, groups, and parties when they are out of power, announce many idealistic and sometimes radical slogans, but after coming to power and facing realities and dialectics, many of these slogans are modified. This is true for the forces that came to power in Syria, including Tahrir al-Sham. Therefore, it can be expected that their anti-Iranian approach will be modified over time and the ground for relations with Iran will be prepared. A similar example is the Taliban in Afghanistan: among this group, there were many radical anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian members and slogans, but after taking power and facing realities, they were forced to modify their positions. The future Syrian government will definitely not be unified, and even if Iran cannot reach an agreement with its radicals, there will probably be moderate spectrums through which Tehran can find a way to relate to Damascus. Therefore, although Iran will not be able to replicate the influence in Syria that it had during the Assad era, this does not mean zero relations with the future government in Damascus.
Second, gap in disputes. The principle of indivisibility of power in the Middle East is certainly true in Syria. Despite Jolani’s democratic statements, there is no way to expect a democratic government under Tahrir al-Sham control. The Kurds, the Free Army, ethnic and religious groups, nationalists, secularists etc., will demand their share of power, and disputes between them and Tahrir al-Sham and within Tahrir al-Sham over the division of power will undoubtedly arise. Disputes will be a window for the influence of regional and extra-regional powers, including Iran.
Third, historical relations. Iran has had and continues to have historical relations with Syria and various ethnic and religious groups in the country. Therefore, it is not the case that after change of government in Damascus, Iran’s relations with all of Syria will be cut off at once. Certainly, given the heavy presence of Tahrir al-Sham, groups inclined to relations with Iran, including the Alawites, will be cautious, but in the future, if an opportunity arises, Iran can use its historical relations with these groups for its own interests. Especially if the pressure from the new government on the Alawites (and others) is great, they will tend to look outside Syria and perhaps to Iran to balance and moderate the pressure.
Fourth, pragmatism and asymmetric influence. Iran’s foreign policy is not only ideological but also pragmatic. Choosing gray-zone strategy
to confront Israel and the ability to establish close relations with Sunni Hamas are signs of Iran’s pragmatism. In pragmatic approach, although the goal is fixed, resources, tools, and playing field to achieve the goal are fluid and variable. Iran’s asymmetric regional influence is exercised in this way. In this type of influence, the resources, tools, or playing field are fundamentally unstable, they can be permanently or temporarily destroyed or lose their effectiveness, but there is a possibility of reviving the influence in other ways. Multi-ethnic and multi-religious characteristics of and disputes in the Middle East, including in Syria, can facilitate applying Iran’s pragmatism and asymmetric influence and continuance its strategic depth.
Fifth, the persistence of the axis of resistance. Although Iran has tried to be at the forefront of the axis of resistance and use it as a source of soft and hard power in its foreign policy, one can agree with Javad Zarif, former Iran’s foreign minister and current vice president for strategic affairs, that “the resistance was not created by Iran, nor does its continuation depend on Iran. The reason for the resistance is the occupation and apartheid of Israel. Resistance against the occupation existed before the revolution (of Iran), and Iran supports this popular movement.” With this assumption, although the axis of resistance has been weakened due to the weakening of Hamas, Hezbollah and, by Assad’s fall, the idea of its ultimate weakening is not accurate, and as it continues to exist, its effectiveness in Iran’s foreign policy will continue.
Sixth, historical experience. Some developments in the region have occurred in recent years that initially seemed to be detrimental to Iran, but over time they either ended up benefiting Iran or did not have the expected harm. Among these, we can mention the attack and occupation of Iraq by the US, one of the goals was certainly to contain and weaken Iran in the region. However, not only the goal was not achieved, but the US operation led to expansion of Iran’s influence in Iraq and the region. Although the US war in Afghanistan, and after that, Taliban’s rise to power could have been detrimental to Iran, this was ultimately not realized. In Yemen, although one of the goals of the Saudi military operation was to create a new Yemen and reduce Iran’s influence, the result is an increase in Iran’s influence.
Seventh, the Palestinian issue. Due to historical, political, ethnic and religious ties between Syria and Palestine, it is unthinkable that the new government in Damascus will ignore Palestine. Although some in this government may seek normalizing relations with Israel even through the Abraham Accords, there are certainly some who continue to defend the Palestinian cause. Although there may be differences between Iran and Syria regarding Palestine issue, the Palestinian cause, even in the form of two states-two nations, can be common ground in the future. The (apparently close) relations between Tahrir al-Sham and some Palestinian forces, including Hamas, are also common points between Iran and the future Syria.
Eighth, hostility towards Israel. As with the issue of Palestine, the new government in Syria cannot ignore historical hostility towards Israel all at once, especially since the issue between the two countries is also territorial. Therefore, although the level of direct confrontation and hostility may be reduced, some issues, including the territorial one, cannot be easily resolved. Nationalist groups in the future government or in future Syria will insist on Syria’s territorial integrity. Israel’s mistake in recent days in entering Syrian territory and bombing the country could strengthen nationalist sentiments in the country and intensify hostility towards Israel. Netanyahu’s plan to surge settler population in occupied Golan Heights would be particularly provocative. The feeling of hostility towards Israel could become common ground with Iran. Considering this assumption, Netanyahu warned
the future Syrian government about possible relations with Iran.
Ninth, competition between regional and international powers. In current uncertainty in Syria, competition between regional and great powers for a share in the country’s future will intensify. In the meantime, coalition building to secure a share continues, and Iran may be able to use this window of opportunity to influence Syria. For example, each of the factions in the future Syrian government will be in contact with one of the regional and international powers. Although Tahrir al-Sham apparently has Turkey as its supporter, this orientation probably has opponents, including among the Kurds. The position of the US, Europe, Russia, Saudi Arabia, etc. is still unclear. Although this uncertainty will not last long, competition between regional and international powers in Syria will certainly continue, and this situation could create spaces for Iran to exert influence.
Tenth, moving along the traditional track. Although the Middle East seems unpredictable, and its rapid developments, such as the fall of Mubarak (Egypt), Saleh (Yemen), Gaddafi (Libya), Ghani (Afghanistan), or Bashar al-Assad, may come as a surprise, the fact is that trends in this region and its countries usually follow a traditional and historical track and are not easily changed. Contrary to expectations, with the overthrow of those leaders, trends did not fundamentally change, and even the instability that was created by their removal has continued along its traditional and historical track. Even the Arab Spring, with all the expectations that were placed on it, failed to bring about fundamental changes in many countries (and the entire region). The situation is likely to be similar in case of Syria. That is, although tactical changes will definitely be seen, the country will probably continue along its traditional track. In this context, Iran, as a historical force in the Middle East, can find its way to influence.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
Please visit the firm link to site
