Greenland’s liberation from Danish colonial rule would inevitably lead to a new form of dependency. The United States has persistently positioned itself as Greenland’s next protector – a role its people will likely have no choice but to accept. The real question is whether Trump will accelerate this process to achieve his goals before his term ends, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov.
When Donald Trump first proposed purchasing Greenland from Denmark in 2019, many dismissed the idea as absurd. After the change of administration, Washington repeatedly denied any such plans. In 2021, then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited the island, and according to The New York Times, his remarks “closed the book on a bizarre episode in US foreign policy.”
However, it was not an ending, only an intermission. The issue of US control over Greenland came back with a vengeance after Trump’s return to power. During a March 13, 2025 press conference with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump responded
to a question about annexing Greenland with characteristic bluntness: “I think it’ll happen.”
“And I’m just thinking,” he added, “I didn’t give it much thought before, but I’m sitting with a man that could be very instrumental. You know, Mark, we need that for international security.” Caught off guard, Rutte quickly clarified that NATO had no intention of involvement, regardless of whether Greenland is “yes or no, joining the US”.
By framing Greenland’s potential annexation as “joining the US”, Rutte – intentionally or not – shifted the discussion to legal grounds: voluntary accession, unlike forced annexation, complies with international law. Trump, however, seemed uninterested in such nuances. He has repeatedly hinted that military force remains an option.
Some analysts interpret Trump’s expansionist rhetoric as an application of Richard Nixon’s “madman theory” – a strategy where unpredictability pressures adversaries into concessions. That Trump directs this tactic toward allies rather than rivals is, in its own way, logical. Yet two factors suggest his intentions are more than just bluster.
First, even in 2019, the idea of acquiring Greenland was less marginal than it appeared. “A significant number of strategists within the US administration either openly or under the cover of anonymity are ready to support the idea,” Danish journalist Martin Breum was writing. However, mainstream American opinion remains sceptical: a recent poll showed only 19% in favour of annexation, with 49% opposed.
Second, Trump clearly aspires to be remembered as an expansionist president in the mould of his hero, William McKinley. Beyond Greenland, he has mused about absorbing Canada and reclaiming the Panama Canal. While the Canada proposal fits the “madman” playbook, forcibly detaching Greenland from Denmark or seizing the Panama Canal cannot be seen as implausible scenarios.
The 1903 transfer of the Panama Canal Zone to the US — a reward for supporting Panama’s independence from Colombia – left a legacy of resentment across Latin America. The incremental return of control to Panama was meant to dispel accusations of colonialism and undercut leftist movements. Today, strong-arming Panama (let alone military action) would achieve the opposite: fuelling anti-American sentiment and boosting the regional influence of Washington’s geopolitical rival, China, whose clout is already growing throughout the region.
The annexation of Greenland would in one way or another provoke an unprecedented crisis in transatlantic relations, but it can be almost ruled out that this would entail the strengthening China’s position. It is difficult to agree with Anatol Lieven’s opinion
that this would push European countries “into the arms of Russia.” Europe has been systematically working for years to ensure that it never has to consider either China or Russia as a “backup option” under any circumstances in the event of geopolitical changes on a tectonic scale.
What are the possible scenarios if establishing control over Greenland becomes a permanent item on the US foreign policy agenda? What form of control will Washington strive for?
First of all, it should be noted that granting Greenland statehood is practically out of the question: with a population of 57,000 people, it has about a tenth the population of the least populated state, Wyoming. In this regard, former Trump National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien’s proposal to incorporate Greenland into Alaska is noteworthy. Greenland could also theoretically become an organised incorporated territory (since 1959, when Alaska and Hawaii became states, no American possession has had this status).
However, a more likely strategy for achieving the stated goal would be to incorporate an independent Greenland into the US orbit. The island’s independence in itself could be presented as a victory for the US, since it would end Europe’s significant territorial presence in North America. Greenlanders would join the family of American nations – and, as we remember, it was in their interests (America for the Americans) that President Monroe claimed to have developed his doctrine.
An independent Greenland’s ties to the US could be formalised, at a minimum, through a defence agreement, similar to the one advocated by the Naleraq party, which came in second in the recent elections on the island. At a maximum, Greenland could receive the status of a Freely Associated State, which is currently enjoyed by the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau. The latter, due to the obvious post-colonial nature of this status, would be a direct insult to the Greenlanders. However, all other options, short of full independence, are also insulting – and contrary to the will of the islanders.
This is the drama of the Greenlanders, because geography, economics and demography do not leave them with such an option. Liberation from Danish colonial rule would automatically mean a new dependence, albeit formalised differently. The US is persistently offering itself as a new protector, and the Greenlanders will most likely have to agree with this. The question is whether Trump will speed up the course of events in order to achieve what he wants during his presidential term. But it is already obvious that his statements on Greenland indicate a readiness to implement national interests based on approaches that break sharply with those proclaimed over the past decades, which presupposes a very different understanding of sovereignty and the inviolability of borders.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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